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This article extends market transition theory to an analysis of inequality under the conditions of partial reform in China. Logit regression analysis indicates cadres (officials) have no greater odds than other households of being among the privileged or avoiding poverty. Entrepreneurs andformer team cadres, however, are advantaged. Despite the rise of a hybrid elite of entrepreneurs who are currently cadres that capitalizes on redistributive power to gain competitive advantage in the marketplace, increases in income inequality are modest. When market reform stimulates improved economic performance, the poor appear to benefit and experience comparable improvements in household income. As a result, there is only a slight increase in inequality, at least in the early stages of market reform. The empirical analysis is based on survey data collected in rural China in 1985. Jn a state socialist redistributive economy, power, defined as control over resources, is a function of position within the redistributive hierarchy. This is less true in a mixed economy in which private markets are expanding in volume and scope. Market transition theory (Nee 1989b) maintains that as the allocation of goods and services shifts to the marketplace, power is mediated more by transactive exchanges and less by administrative fiat. As a result, power is no longer monopolized by redistributors; instead it becomes more diffused in the economy and society. The growth of markets expands the range of opportunities outside the boundaries of the redistributive economy, changing the structures of opportunity and incentives and stimulating entrepreneurship and economic performance. For these reasons, market transition theory claims that the shift from hierarchies to markets causes a decline in the significance of positional power in the redistributive sector.
As the significance of redistributive power delines, inequality between redistributors and direct producers also declines. Privileges enjoyed by workers in the redistributive sector relative to the market sector are also reduced. Direct producers gain a larger share of the surplus through market transactions, while redistributors gradually lose the capacity to deploy resources to themselves. Regions with poorly developed markets exhibit slower growth rates relative to marketized areas, giving rise to interregional inequality. Workers and staff in the nonmarket sector may lose privileges relative to workers in the marketized sectors of the economy who can now negotiate wages. Even within state-owned firms, workers who participate in marketlike transactions realize higher rewards than those who do not (Stark 1990 ). Sociological studies confirm that the shift to markets is likely to result in a reduction of social inequality structured by redistributive processes. Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) report that the privatization of urban housing in Hungary "discouraged elite privileges" and that the overall effect of market reform on the cadre elite led to a "gradual erosion of its material privileges" (p. 124). Other studies of economic reform in Eastern Europe corroborate this view (Connor 1979; Lane 1982 ,Ferge 1979 . Huang (1990, p. 443 ) noted a widening income gap in China between state of-ficials and enterprise employees, with officials falling noticeably behind employees from 1978 to 1986. Walder's (1990) study of income inequality in Tianjin documented a decline in economic returns for party members and a reduction of income inequality in the state sector. Whyte (1986) maintained that egalitarian policies during the Cultural Revolution in China gave rise to new forms of inequality, and concurred with the view that markets may have an equalizing effect in state socialist societies. Flakierski (1986) found that market reform in Hungary and Poland did not increase income inequality.
However, under partial reform, the reduction of social inequality is likely to be confounded by conflicting institutional dynamics. The still dominant redistributive institutions interact with market forces in a manner that subordinates market institutions. In the absence of well-defined and legally protected private property rights, there can be no market economy. As a result, emergent market institutions remain bounded by political institutions of the state and by social networks linking the state to social and economic institutions (Nee 1989a; Oi 1989) ; the underlying rules of competition and cooperation that structure property rights are poorly articulated and enforced (Nee and Young 1991). For these reasons, redistributors still wield considerable power under partial reform. especially in the collective and state sectors. Bureaucratic interventions in the operation of firms persist and weaken market discipline and incentives (Kornai 1986 (Kornai , 1989 . Redistributors continue to exercise substantial control over factor resources and marketing outlets. Some factors of production are distributed by the state at lower than market prices (Oi 1986 ). For peasants, these include essential items such as chemical fertilizer, gasoline, and herbicides. Private entrepreneurs, on the other hand, often can purchase crucial raw materials only through state monopolies. Apart from personal savings, the major source of credit capital is state-owned banks. Many private or quasi-private firms (collective and cooperative enterprises) must sell their products to state-owned trading companies and stores.
Hence, peasants and entrepreneurs often must seek the favor of local officials (cadres) to gain access to resources and marketing outlets. Cadres are often in a position to make or break deals when entrepreneurs negotiate transactions with firms and government agencies. For example, subsidized prices for raw materials, tax breaks, and marketing outlets that provide stable prices and steady demand for their products are all of interest to entrepreneurs. Many entrepreneurs, therefore, cultivate connections (guanxi) that provide access to cadres to protect against the uncertainties of a marketlike environment in which the institutional safeguards and regulated procedures of a true market economy are lacking. The cost of transacting across the boundaries of the redistributive and marketized sectors often involves gifts and bribes to cadres who hold redistributive power.2 Furthermore, under partial reform, cadres continue to assign mandatory production quotas, collect taxes, control permits to engage in business, and enforce regulations. These institutional characteristics of partial reform provide a continuing basis for clientelism (Oi 1989; Huang 1989) .
Market transition theory turns on the extent to which markets replace hierarchies in the allocation of resources. The less the market coordinates, the greater the power of cadres in the redistributive bureaucracy. In a market economy, the market comprises a complex set of institutions centered on property rights and the exchange of goods and services. Under partial reform, the institutional foundations of a market economy are only partially in place and the state-run redistributive economy remains the dominant integrative mechanism of the economy. Not only do cadres continue to redistribute resources by virtue of their positional power, but market action may reinforce, or even amplify, redistributive power. For example, collective enterprises operating in a market environment may experience improved economic performance, thereby strengthening the redistributive capacity of local governments that claim property rights over them (Nee 1990) .
Complicating matters, the expansion of markets generates new sources of social inequalities. Especially in the early stages of market-driven economic development, the newly acquired wealth of entrepreneurs can be expected to result in increased inequality between the rich and poor (Kuznets 1963; Oshima 1962 Szelenyi (1978) reasoned that market reform, in counteracting the inequalities produced by the dominant redistributive economy, results in benefits to the powerless and less privileged. However, Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) modified this conjecture. They argued that after an initial equalizing effect, market-created inequalities begin to reinforce the inequalities generated by the redistributive economy. Echoing the cumulative advantage hypothesis, they argued that the privileges of the entrepreneurial elite in Hungary, after more than a decade of market reform, approached that of the cadre elite, while those at the bottom of the social hierarchy did not share in the benefits of reform. Moreover, they pointed to a possible merging of the elites based on bureaucratic rank and market-generated wealth. Based on observations of interactions between redistributive and market forces in Hungary, they anticipated the rise of the hybrid cadre-entrepreneur elite.4 This view implies that market reform in time generates greater inequality, contradicting thereby the earlier prediction of a decline in social inequalities. I Taiwan is an example of an unreformed one-party political system where market-driven economic development resulted in the gradual erosion of official power and privileges relative to that of entrepreneurs and direct producers (see Gold 1986 ). The Nationalist Party has ruled Taiwan continuously since 1945. Patronage, corruption, and authoritarian rule have also characterized Taiwan's government. There is no a priori reason why a similar process of erosion of official power and privilege relative to entrepreneurs and workers could not take place in China, if market transition is not interrupted by political opposition. Because markets erode redistributive power, political opposition is inherent in the expansion of markets in reforming state socialism. I Szelenyi and Manchin (1987) noted that elements of the cadre elite in Hungary adapted surprisingly well to markets: "Rather than allowing the market to gradually take away their previous advantages, they learned how to use the market; one might say that they consented to the market reform to the extent to which they themselves learned how to appropriate its benefits" (p. 120).
The rural political economy in China provides a vantage point from which to gauge the effect of market reform on the relative and absolute distribution of rewards. Free markets expanded rapidly in the 1980s (Watson 1988) , although local cadres continued to redistribute resources, control factor markets, and assign quota-production to household farms. The dominant integrative mechanism of the economy as a whole remains redistributive, despite shifts to marketlike conditions in a peripheral sector like agriculture. Redistribution still defines the relationship between peasant and state insofar as peasants continue to produce a mandated quota of grain and other agricultural products to sell to the state at set prices. Despite increases since 1978 in the state price for grain, the quota-price remains substantially below the market price, which is why quota production is in essence a tax on the peasantry (Sicular 1985) . After meeting their annual quota, however, peasants may sell their grain on the free market or to the state at negotiated abovequota prices. The proportion of cash income from marketlike transactions has grown dramatically since 1978, representing 50 percent or more of peasant household income in some areas. Peasants also sell non-agricultural products directly in the marketplace. The increasing proportion of market-derived income, including income from jobs in rural industries, largely accounts for the greater prosperity of peasant households following market reform (Nee and Su 1990). What is the effect of partial reform on the structure of inequality in state socialism?
DATA AND METHODS
The analysis uses survey research data that I collected during the summer of 1985 in rural China. A cluster sampling procedure drew a probability sample of 30 villages from two counties located adjacent to the Xiamen Special Economic Zone in Fujian province. We randomly selected 25 households from each village. This sampling procedure resulted in 624 completed interviews. We also conducted ethnographic interviews with current cadres in these 30 villages and peasant entrepreneurs in the area.
Fujian is not representative of China as a whole. My aim is to estimate the effect of theoretically selected covariates on the structure of inequality in an area that has experienced rapid marketization. Fujian's rural per capita income in 1986 was close to the median for China's 29 provinces (Walker 1989 ). However, Fujian has special characteristics that set it apart from inland provinces. These include a history of out-migration to southeast Asia and relatively easy access to Hong Kong and, more recently, to Taiwan However, the greater ease of travel to Fujian after 1985 has encouraged overseas Chinese investment in the local economy, but at the time this survey was conducted, such involvement was not significant. 6 For a discussion of the reliability of the income data, see Nee (1989b, p. 669). Interviewers were recruited from graduate students and lecturers at Xiamen University who came from the area and spoke the local dialect. No government officials were present at the interviews. Interviewers explained to respondents that the survey was independent of the government and was administered for scholarly purposes. The highest household incomes were reported by entrepreneurs, cadre-entrepreneurs, and former cadres, groups that might be expected to underreport income. Some of these respondents reported household incomes so much higher than others that they became the "outliers" in the sample. Overall there was considerable variance in the incomes reported by households. hold size and the composition of the household labor force. Young children contribute labor to the peasant household economy, but not at the same level as adults.
Interviewers asked whether someone in the household, currently or in the past, served as a cadre. Current cadres hold positional power in the local government. Almost all of the former cadres in the sample served as officials in either the production brigade or the production team; only one former cadre was an official in a people's commune. In rural China, the production team now exists only on paper, whereas the brigade and commune have become the village and township governments respectively. Reflecting the broad participation in village organizations under Maoist China, 15.2 percent of the Fujian sample reported that a member of the household served in the past as a local cadre.
All households were asked whether they operated a family business, and if so, how much startup capital they invested. Households that invested more than 200 yuan start-up capital were included in the entrepreneur category. A higher cut-off point, say, 1000 yuan, would have resulted in sample selection bias (Berk 1983 ) by eliminating households that invested modest amounts of capital, yet rose to the top income quintile, particularly entrepreneurial households that have former cadres (see Table 4 ). These households are of particular interest because their advantage may yield insight into the value of clientelist ties in the pursuit of economic gain. In entrepreneurship, modest start-up capital can yield significant profit. For peasant entrepreneurs in the sample, the most common source of start-up capital was personal savings; few relied on loans from banks or friends. Clientelists focus on the latter source, which may be important for larger enterprises, but not important to most entrepreneurs. Market transition theory emphasizes the importance of the breadth and depth of entrepreneurial activity. It is the multitude of small family enterprises and their market activities and the expansion of labor markets that produce the predicted change in the stratification order favoring direct producers relative to redistributors. These same processes gradually erode the basis of clientelist politics -the exchange of public goods for personal loyalty I The amount of start-up capital may not be as critical in launching small businesses as the spirit of enterprise. This has been demonstrated by legendary American entrepreneurs who launched firms from their "garages." Taiwan is a notable East Asian example of late capitalist development driven by family firms that began as small businesses. between patron and client. The more product and factor resources that are exchanged in the marketplace, the weaker the basis for clientelism.
In the sample, cadre-entrepreneurs are a relatively small (9.6 percent) part of peasant entrepreneurs. Former cadres who have entered into private-sector entrepreneurship are more numerous (13.7 percent). Former cadres, however, should not be viewed as members of the cadre elite, although they belong to the same status group. Instead, they are comparable to the gentry in traditional China. When scholar-officials returned to their villages after serving in the imperial bureaucracy, they continued to enjoy high status. This social capital usually is reflected in wider social networks or what the Chinese call guanxiwang. To the extent that former cadres are able to profit from accumulated social capital, instituted in network ties to current cadres who hold power in the redistributive sector, they should be advantaged relative to other entrepreneurs. The majority of entrepreneurs (76.8 percent) do not derive from cadre background, either as current or former cadres. They comprise the greater part of the new economic elite in the countryside.
MARKET TRANSITION AND THE POOR
It is widely believed that markets benefit the strong and rich, but undermine the economic position of the weak and poor (Marx 1958; Polanyi 1944; Scott 1976 ). This view seemingly has influenced Szelenyi and Manchin, who wrote that for those at the "bottom of the income hierarchy" a "real pauperization took place" (1987, p. 122) in.Hungary. They pointed out that market reform in state socialism is typically accompanied by price inflation and the erosion of welfare programs and subsidies. Cadres in the core redistributive sectors are able to fend off the worst effects of inflation, but the weak and poor lack the political resources to weather the twin threats of inflation and erosion of welfare subsidies. What is overlooked is whether the shift to market coordination stimulates economic growth. When market reform results in improved economic performance, far from experiencing pauperization, the poor instead may experience direct material gains.
Data from rural China demonstrate the relationship between economic growth and increases in per capita income. In the initial years of reform, the combined effects of an increased purchase price for agricultural products, decollectivization, and marketization produced a rapid spurt in economic growth. (Chayanov 1986) or structural changes in the agricultural economy following economic reform in 1978 is not clear. However, the overall impression is one of underlying continuity in the structure of inequality and the composition of the poor prior to reform.
The shift from collective agriculture to market-oriented household commodity production took place from 1980 to 1984. In this four-year span, substantially more vertical mobility took place, stemming from structural changes in the determination of income. Panel B shows a sizable increase in the percentage of the poor who moved to higher income brackets compared to the earlier period -45.8 percent of households 9 Students of inequality tend to emphasize the negative aspects of relative inequality without giving adequate attention to absolute poverty. Rawls (1971) argued that the optimal income distribution is one that reduces the level of absolute poverty. In his view, only if the economic position of the poorest stratum of society is improved is there welfare improvement. A careful comparison of the mobility patterns of the rich and poor from 1975 to 1984 shows that there was more upward mobility of poor peasants than downward mobility of the rich. Overall, upward mobility was greater than the downward mobility during this period, a fact attributable to rapid economic growth.'" The breadth and volume of both upward and downward vertical mobility, following marketization render it unlikely that households' chances for economic gain or loss were controlled mainly by cadres. Clientelist politics can flourish when cadres monopolize access to scarce resources and vertical mobility involves relatively few households, as in the Maoist era. The cadres' tight grip over village events in the Maoist era becomes less tenable when markets penetrate villages markets offer peasants alternative sources of valued resources and permit more extensive social mobility.
Which households were apt to be more concentrated in the top income quintiles? Table 3 reports the 1984 median household income for the village elite comprising cadres, former cadres, cadre-entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs who were formerly cadres, and entrepreneurs who had never been cadres. Only 12 percent of current cadres 0 Gottschalk and Danziger (1985) showed that economic growth in the U.S. has been the primary source of poverty reduction. The beneficial effect of a rising mean income on the reduction of poverty, however, can be offset by increasing inequality (Danziger and Gottschalk 1986). 1 percent of the sample, whereas those with brigade cadres constituted 3.1 percent, suggesting that service as a team cadre was relatively commonplace. Brigade cadres were full-time officials, whereas team cadres were typically recruited as team cadres because of their expertise in farm production and continued to engage in agricultural work during their term of service. The greater yield on investment of entrepreneurs who had been cadres may reflect superior expertise and management skills (human capital) gained from running the production team, the lowest unit of collective agriculture, rather than stemming from better personal access (social capital) to current cadres. This form of social capital constitutes the relationship that clientelists argue is crucial to their perspective. Despite difficulties of interpretation, there is a striking similarity in the income distributions of entrepreneurs with cadre experience, regardless of whether they currently hold or formerly held positional power in the agricultural collectiveboth groups appear to be spared from poverty. Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates from a logistic regression analysis of the effect of cadre status and entrepreneurship on the log-odds of a household's inclusion in the top quintile and absence from the bottom incomequintile in 1984.11 The omitted category is the bottom income quintile. Current cadre status is a statistically significant predictor of advantage, as shown in Models I and 2. At first glance, this finding bolsters previous qualitative research supporting the clientelist claim of no decline in cadre power (Oi 1989; Huang 1989 ).12 When human capital and household labor force composition are controlled, however, the effect of current cadre status is not statistically significant (Models 3 and 4) . This is consistent with previous research based on OLS regression analysis (Nee 1989b , p. 672) . Thus, in an OLS model that estimated change in household income following market reform and in a maximum likelihood model predicting inclusion in the privileged category, current cadres appear to enjoy no return on their status net of human capital and household composition. Former team cadre status has a statistically significant effect on inclusion in the top income quintile taking the exponential of the logit, a former team cadre has 3.7 times greater odds of being part of the economic elite than other households.
The social rank of former brigade cadres is superior to that of the more numerous former team cadres. Brigade cadres supervised subordinate team cadres, and they are apt to be informal village leaders and retain personal ties to current village cadres. If patron-client ties were critical to economic success, former brigade cadres ought to benefit. Yet in all four models, former brigade cadres appear to enjoy no advantage. This finding suggests that human capital rather than the social capital gained from the team cadre experience explains the results and, that clientelist ties are not in themselves a sufficient condition for economic gain following market reform.
Entrepreneurs show a statistically significant log-odds of being among the new rural elite. Under Model 3, the odds of an entrepreneur being in the top quintile is 3.9 times greater than that for other households. The lack of advantage of current cadre and the advantage of former team cadres are consistent with market transition theory's claim of declining significance of redistributive power. Ironically, cadres in the current marketlike economy do not derive advantage from their status, whereas those who served as team cadres in the past and are no longer redistributors can maintain and even enhance their privilege I The logit analysis of the effect of cadre status uses 585 cases; whereas OLS estimates reported in Nee (1989b) were based on 498 cases. Improvements in coding allowed for the increase in cases. The actual number reported in the tables may vary somewhat due to missing data. believe this is plausible evidence that current cadres do receive gifts and that they reported them as household possessions, just as they reported higher median household income. Although there was no difference between cadres and noncadres in the per capita size of their homes, entrepreneurs had larger homes than everybody else; the correlation between entrepreneur status and per capita size of home was statistically significant (p < .05). and power through market-oriented activity as direct producers who benefit from both human and social capital gained from past experience as local cadres. Model 4 indicates that current cadre status does not predict exclusion from the rural poor, whereas being an entrepreneur or a former team cadre reduces the likelihood of being in the poorest group by 2.2 and 2.6 times, respectively.
Human Table 6 indicates that income inequality in Fujian province increased only slightly from 1975 to 1984, as reflected by the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation. Moreover, the percentage of aggregate total income earned by the top and bottom income quintiles in Fujian shows little change. This is remarkable in light of the considerable vertical mobility experienced by rural households during these years. The rapid reduction of absolute poverty and increases in wealth of peasant and cadre entrepreneurs were achieved with only a slight increase in relative inequality. An initial decline in inequality followed by an increase might be viewed as consistent with Szelenyi and Manchin's prediction. But if 1975 to 1984 is considered in the short term, then the modest increase in inequality is consistent with the economists' view. However, the differences are small enough to be accounted for by measurement error.14 The finding that the poor benefited from marketization along with the rich contradicts both perspectives.
A parallel survey conducted in 1986 by Zhu (1990) cline. Students of stratification in Eastern Europe should be able to test this hypothesis in the 1990s. If a hybrid elite of cadre-entrepreneurs manages to uphold the dominance of the redistributive class following the transition to a market economy, then market transition theory must be wrong.
The declining-significance-of-redistributivepower hypothesis finds support in the discovery that current cadre status, following a shift to marketlike conditions, has no effect on a household's chances of being in the top income quintile, nor in its avoidance of poverty, nor in the rate of increase of household income. These findings are at variance with and cannot be accounted for by the clientelist perspective (Walder 1986; Oi 1989) . 16 If, as clientelists claim, cadres continue to be as powerful and privileged after marketization as before, why are they not more advantaged than others, net of human capital and household composition effects? The finding that entrepreneurs and former team cadres in the sample are more likely to fall in the top income quintile, however, underscores the changing sources of power and privilege even in the early stages of market transition. It is through productive effort and entrepreneurial drive, rather than positional power in local government, that wealth is gained following decollectivization and marketization.
Despite the emergence of hybrid elite entrepreneurs from cadre backgrounds, initial evidence indicates that reliance on market coordination in reforming socialist economies need not generate widening social inequalities. Why is there so little increase in inequality in the early stage of marketization? First, vertical mobility of the poor is substantial. This indicates that entrepreneurs come from varied backgrounds. Though many come from cadre backgrounds, many more come from households that were poor and less privileged under collective farming. This latter group may include households that were rich prior to collectivization and became the objects of class struggle during periods of agrarian radicalism.
Evidence from Hungary indicates that second economy entrepreneurs typically come from entrepreneurial households whose embourgeoisement was interrupted by collectivization. These families left "parking orbits" to reenter private entrepreneurship when market opportunities once again became available (Szelenyi 1988 ). There is also considerable relative downward mobility of the old rich who are unsuccessful in adapting from a collective to a marketlike economy. The combined effects of upward and downward mobility during market transition may reduce the aggregate inequality.
Second, when market reform is accompanied by improved economic performance, the poor appear to participate directly in the benefits of the marketplace. Not only do poor households benefit from entrepreneurial opportunities, but transactive exchanges in the marketplace enable direct producers to retain a greater proportion of the surplus above the cost of production than is true in a state socialist redistributive economy in which surplus is appropriated by administrative fiat. This broad participation in marketlike transactive exchanges generates a different dynamic of wealth distribution than implied is by trickledown theory.
Market transition theory does not assume that the direction of change is unidirectional or linear. Since 1988, progress on market reform has slowed in China and the Soviet Union, and there is evidence of key reversals towards greater reliance on central planning. As long as redistribution remains the dominant integrative mechanism for the economy as a whole, oppositional forces threatened by the erosion of redistributive power can attempt to roll back the extent of market coordination. Yet efforts to revive redistributive authority in the wake of market reform are likely to yield unstable results, as events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union demonstrate. The spread of market transactions, whether in the formal or informal private economy, tends to erode the legitimacy of state socialistredistributive authority and paves the way for political change. 16 Hypotheses consistent with the clientelist perspective can be derived from market transition theory. For example, officials in daily contact with citizens retain their power and privilege under partial reform to the extent that markets remain bounded by redistributive bureaucracies. This new hypothesis explains why, within the marketized redistributive sector there may be no overall erosion of redistributive power despite relatively higher wages for enterprise employees (Nee 1990 
